ICC hears challenge to admissibility in Gaddafi case

The International Criminal Court (ICC) began a hearing on the Libyan government’s challenge to admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi.  Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi is the son of the late Muammar al-Gaddafi and is allegedly criminally responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator for two counts of crimes against humanity: murder, within the meaning of article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute; and persecution, within the meaning of article 7(1)(h). 

                                       

The Libyan government argues that a Libyan court, rather than the ICC, should have jurisdiction in the case. 

Gaddafi’s ICC defense counsel argued that the ICC should conduct the trial.  The defense argued that Libyan authorities are unwilling and unable genuinely to carry out the investigation and prosecution.  Among concerns raised by the defense were the Libyan authorities’ treatment of potential witnesses who are in government custody, the authorities’ alleged monitoring of attorney-client communications and provision of misleading information to the Court, the detention of Gaddafi’s defense counsel and other ICC staff in Libya, and the lack of correlation between the Libyan investigation against Gaddafi and the ICC case.  To show that the case is inadmissible, the Libyan authorities would have to show that they are pursuing Gaddafi for the same or substantially the same conduct as that specified in the ICC proceedings.

The hearing is scheduled to resume tomorrow at 9:30 a.m.

Mrkšić transferred to Portugal to serve sentence

On August 16, 2012, Mile Mrkšić, who was previously sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), was transferred to Portugal to serve his sentence for crimes against non-Serb prisoners of war. 

Mrkšić is a former colonel of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and was commander of the Guards Motorized Brigade and Operation Group South.  He oversaw all Serb forces in the area in which the offenses occurred, including JNA, Territorial Defence (TO), and paramilitary forces. 

Background

Mrkšić was sentenced on September 27, 2007, for aiding and abetting murder, torture, and cruel treatment of prisoners, as well as inhumane conditions at the hangar of Ovčara. 

The Chamber found that, in accordance with orders from Mrkšić, the JNA loaded approximately 260 non-Serbs from Vukovar hospital on buses and transported them to JNA barracks, then to a hangar at Ovčara. There, the prisoners were subjected to severe beatings. 

The Trial Chamber found that Mrkšić withdrew JNA troops and left the prisoners with the TO and paramilitary members, who killed at least 194 of the prisoners and buried them in a mass grave.  The Chamber concluded that, by withdrawing the JNA officers and soldiers who were guarding prisoners of war, Mrkšić rendered substantial assistance to the Territorial Defense (TO) and paramilitary troops, who were then able to commit numerous murders.  The Trial Chamber concluded that Mrkšić knew that the Serb TO and paramilitary troops felt intense animosity toward Croat forces.  Mrkšić was aware of the treatment of the prisoners, and he had been informed that prisoners had been executed by TO and paramilitary personnel on the previous day.  By ordering withdrawal of the JNA military police who were guarding the prisoners when he knew of the high risk that TO and paramilitary forces would subject the prisoners to serious violence and death, Mrkšić aided and abetted the offenses of murder committed as a consequence of his withdrawal order.  Thus, Mrkšić was responsible under 7(1) of the Statute for aiding and abetting murder. 

Mrkšić took no steps to reinforce the guards at Ovčara or improve measures to prevent violence against prisoners at the hands of the TO and paramilitary forces despite knowing of severe mistreatment.  By failing to act, he gave practical assistance and encouragement to those who sought revenge on the prisoners.  The Chamber further found that JNA forces under Mrkšić’s command established inhumane conditions of detention.  Therefore, Mrkšić was responsible under Article 7(1) of the Statute for aiding and abetting torture and cruel treatment.

Sentences of those convicted by the ICTY are served outside the Netherlands in States that have signed an agreement on the enforcement of sentences with the ICTY.  Mrkšić is the first person to be transferred to Portugal. 

Mladic Trial Resumes After Summer Recess

The trial of Ratko Mladic resumed on August 21, 2012, following the ICTY summer recess.  The Court heard testimony from Aernout Van Lynden, a journalist who covered the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Van Lynden spent time in Sarajevo and Pale during the war and met with both Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. 

Prior to the recess, testimony was heard from the following witnesses: Elvedin Pašić, who fled from his village after it was attacked by Bosnian Serb forces and was detained by Bosnian Serb soldiers; David Harland, a UN employee stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the relevant time; Christina Schmitz, a nurse who worked for Doctors Without Borders in Srebrenica; Joseph Kingori, a UN military observer deployed to Srebrenica in 1995; a protected witness known as RM255, who was a survivor of the executions at the Branjevo Military Farm; and Eelco Koster, who was an officer of the Dutch Batallion stationed at Potočari .

ICC Issues First Reparations Decision

Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court has decided on the principles that are to apply for reparations for victims in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.  This is the first reparations decision by an ICC chamber.

Mr. Lubanga was found guilty of war crimes (conscripting and enlisting children under age 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities).  He was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. 

The Chamber stated: “Reparations in the present case must-to the extent achievable-relieve the suffering caused by these offences; afford justice to the victims by alleviating the consequences of the wrongful acts; deter future violations; and contribute to the effective reintegration of former child soldiers.”  In the Chamber’s view, the reparations should be applied in a broad and flexible manner, allowing the Chamber to approve the widest possible remedies for violations of the rights of victims and the means of implementation. 

The Chamber stated that its decision applied only to the case under consideration and was not intended to affect victims’ rights to reparations in other cases.

The Chamber affirmed that all victims must be treated “fairly and equally” with respect to reparations, regardless of whether they participated in trial proceedings, because it would be “inappropriate” to allow reparations only for the small number of victims who participated in the trial or applied for reparations.  The Chamber acknowledged that victims in particularly vulnerable situations might need to be given priority with respect to reparations.  Such victims may include victims of sexual or gender-based violence, individuals who require immediate medical care, and severely traumatized children.  The Court may adopt measures to guarantee equal, effective, and safe access to reparations for particularly vulnerable victims. 

The Chamber emphasized that individual reparations should be awarded in a way that avoids creating tensions and divisions within the affected communities.  It stated that, due to the considerable number of people affected and the small number who applied for reparations, there should be a collective approach that ensures reparations reach the victims who are unidentified.  Collective reparations, according to the Chamber, should address harm individuals suffered on an individual and collective basis.  The Chamber stated that the Court should consider providing medical services, along with assistance in the areas of general rehabilitation, housing, education, and training.  The Chamber further stated that the Court’s reparations strategy should, in part, aim to prevent future conflicts and raise awareness that the effective reintegration of children requires eradicating the victimization, stigmatization, and discrimination against young people in these circumstances.

The “damage, loss and injury,” which forms the basis of a reparations claim, must have resulted from the crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities.  The Chamber noted that neither the Statue nor the Rules define the precise requirements of the causal link between the crime and the relevant harm for the purposes of reparations.  The Chamber further noted that there is no settled view in international law on the approach to be taken to causation.  The Chamber concluded that reparations should not be limited to “direct” harm or the “immediate effects” of the crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under age 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities; rather, the Court should apply the standard of “proximate cause.” 

With respect to the standard of proof, the Chamber concluded that a standard less exacting than “reasonable doubt” should apply.  The Chamber determined that the “balance of probabilities” standard was sufficient and proportionate to establish facts that are relevant to an order for reparations when it is directed against the convicted person.  When reparations are awarded from the resources of the TFV or from any other source, the Chamber concluded that a wholly flexible approach to determining factual matters is appropriate, taking into account the extensive and systematic nature of the crimes and the number of victims involved.

The Chamber decided that it was unnecessary for the present trial judges to remain seized throughout the reparations proceedings.  The reparations will be dealt with by the TFV, monitored and overseen by a differently composed chamber.

The Chamber strongly recommended retention of a multi-disciplinary team of experts to assist the Court in the following areas: assessing the harm suffered by the victims; assessing the effect of the crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under age 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities on the children’s families and communities; identifying the most appropriate form of reparations, in close consultation with the victims and their communities; determining which individuals, bodies, groups, or communities who should be awarded reparations; and assessing the funds for these purposes.

As Mr. Lubanga was declared indigent and no property or assets were identified to use for reparations, Mr. Lubanga is only able to contribute non-monetary reparations.  Any participation in symbolic reparations (e.g., an apology) is only appropriate with Mr. Lubanga’s agreement, so such measures will not form part of a Court order.

Reparations are to be implemented through the resources of the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV).  Potential beneficiaries include victims (direct and indirect) who suffered harm following the crimes of enlisting, conscripting, and using children under age 15 to participate actively in hostilities in Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from September 1, 2002, to August 13, 2003.  This includes family members of direct victims, along with individuals who intervened to help the victims or to prevent the commission of the crimes and suffered harm as a result. 

The Chamber noted that, for the award to have effect, State Parties, including the DRC, and non-State Parties must cooperate and the TFV would need sufficient voluntary contributions for a meaningful and effective reparations program. 

ECHR Finds Government Failed to Meet Convention Responsibilities in Disappearance Case

The European Court of Human Rights found that Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security), and 13 (right to an effective remedy) had been violated in a case involving an individual who disappeared after being taken by Government agents.  Notably, the Court found that a more flexible approach was justified with respect to the six-month time limit for application to the Court (see Article 35) in the context of disappearance cases, not merely in the context of an international armed conflict (as the Court held in Varnava and Others v. Turkey), but also in the national context.

The applicants, Mr. Mehmet Er, Ms. Gülşen Er, Mr. İslam Er, Mr. Adnan Er, Mr. Hızır Er, Ms. Hatice Er, Ms. Belkısa Er, Mr. Ali Er, and Ms. Mumi Er, lodged an application against Turkey in the ECHR.  The first seven applicants are Ahmet Er’s children; the other two are his siblings.  The applicants alleged that Ahmet Er disappeared following detention by gendarmerie soldiers in circumstances engaging the responsibility of the State under Articles 2, 3, 5, and 13 of the Convention. 

  

On the day that Ahmet Er disappeared, Ali Er, Ahmet’s brother, informed the local prosecutor in writing that his brother had disappeared and the family feared for Ahmet’s life.  On July 16, 1995, the prosecutor indicated in a report that he had a telephone conversation with Major C.Y. of the Çukurca commando headquarters, the commanding officer of the soldiers who carried out the operation on July 14, 1995.  The major told the prosecutor that Ahmet Er was taken from his village to help with operations, then released on July 16, 1995 near Narlı village. 

On July 18, Ali Er stated in submissions to the prosecutor and the governor of Çukurca that Ahmet Er was not released and that he had tried to find his brother in nearby villages and towns.  The prosecutor opened an investigation into Ahmet’s disappearance and requested information from the Çukurca Gendarmerie Headquarters and Çukurca Commando Headquarters.  The prosecutor also reminded the military authorities that if Mr. Er was in their custody, they needed permission from the prosecutor’s office to detain him. 

Captain S.A.U., commander of the Çukurca Gendarmerie Headquarters, informed the prosecutor that Ahmet Er was not detained at his headquarters.  He said the village of Kurudere was evacuated for security reasons, so it was impossible to trace Ahmet Er.  The Çukurca Commando Headquarters failed to respond to the prosecutor’s request, so he made a second request, asking the headquarters to tell him exactly where Mr. Er was released and whether there were any eyewitnesses to the release.  On September 22, 1995, a military officer from the Çukurca Commando Headquarters wrote a letter to the prosecutor in which he stated that Ahmet Er and his “elderly relative” were taken to provide guidance for the soldiers, had helped the soldiers find landmines, and “left the soldiers at 3.00 p.m.” 

A prosecutor questioned Ali Er on October 16, 1995.  Ali said that Ahmet was taken from their village by soldiers, and the first lieutenant who was with the soldiers slapped his brother in front of the villagers.  After this, the villagers left the village, but Hacı Mehrap Er stayed behind to wait for Ahmet.  That evening, Ahmet returned to the village with the soldiers, very distraught.  The soldiers took Ahmet and Hacı Mehrap Er to Işıklı gendarmerie station, where they tied both men to a pole and left them overnight.  The two had also been beaten up.  Hacı Mehrap Er and two other villagers who were taken were released on the following morning.  According to Hacı Mehrap Er, Ahmet was unconscious when he left him.  Fettah Arslan, who was from their village, had seen Ahmet being taken from Işıklı station to the commando unit in a military vehicle. 

Fettah Arslan and Hacı Mehrap Er were asked to come to the prosecutor’s office.  Fettah Arslan told the prosecutor he saw Ahmet Er in a military vehicle in handcuffs.  Hacı Mehrap Er told the prosecutor that the villagers had been ordered to evacuate and were preparing to do so, but some PKK members heard about the evacuation and the soldiers’ presence in the village and attacked the soldiers.  During the melee, Ahmet Er wanted to leave the village and find his son, who was in the fields, but the soldiers misinterpreted his intentions and took him to the gendarmerie station, where Hacı Mehrap Er was later taken.  The two were tied to a pole, beaten up, and doused with hot water.  The bones in Ahmet’s feet were broken with a stone.  When Hacı Mehrap Er was released, Ahmet was being dragged on the ground by several soldiers.  Hacı Mehrap Er returned to the village, but the soldiers had burned it down. 

Major C.Y. told the prosecutor that he had heard that Ahmet Er was taken from the village to provide guidance about the area and that, after his telephone conversation with the prosecutor, he had ordered Ahmet Er’s release.  He said that he later found out that the person released was not Ahmet Er, and he did not know whether Ahmet Er had been taken away by his soldiers.

The prosecutor questioned First Lieutenant H.Ö., who was in command of one of the units that took part in the July 14 operation.  He said that, following the battle with the PKK, the soldiers saw Ahmet Er running from the village.  The soldiers who caught him “might have slapped him a few times” because they believed he had helped the PKK.  Then, according to the lieutenant, Ahmet Er helped them find landmines.  On the way, they encountered Hacı Mehrap Er, who asked to go with them.  They took the two men to the gendarmerie headquarters, where the lieutenant phoned his superior officers, who said they need not take the men to headquarters as there was no evidence against them.  They might have slapped the men but did not torture them, and they released the men the next day.  Other officers questioned by the prosecutor said that Ahmet Er might have joined the PKK. 

The prosecutor issued an instruction to find Ahmet Er and asked for a progress report every three months.  In his instruction, he stated that Ahmet had not been arrested by the soldiers but had been taken as a guide.  He also stated that, since two of Ahmet’s sons had joined the PKK, Ahmet might have done likewise. 

It appears from documents that the police and soldiers searched unsuccessfully for Ahmet and informed the prosecutor regularly. 

On May 3, 2002, Mehmet Er applied to the Hakkari Civil Court, stating that his father had disappeared on July 14, 1995, in life threatening circumstances and had not been heard from since.  He requested that the court issue a decree stating that his father was presumed dead.  The request was granted on May 29, 2003. 

The Çukurca prosecutor issued a decision on December 10, 2003, stating that, according to allegations and eyewitness accounts, Ahmet Er was last seen in a military area where he was “tortured by soldiers,” so the military prosecutor in the city of Van had jurisdiction.  The military prosecutor  requested information from the military units and questioned Ali Er and Hacı Mehrap Er.  The military units said that they had released Ahmet and he had gone to join the PKK in northern Iraq. 

The military prosecutor concluded that he did not have jurisdiction to investigate because military prosecutors could only investigate offenses committed by members of the military in the performance of their military duties, and the soldiers had been carrying out judicial rather than military functions when they took Ahmet to the barracks to question him.  The case was sent back to the Çukurca prosecutor’s office. 

The Çukurca prosecutor prepared a report on his investigation on December 15, 2005.  The report said that Ahmet had been taken away because he was acting suspiciously, then he helped the soldiers find landmines.  He stayed at the gendarmerie station and was released on July 16, 1995.  According to “secret investigations” by the gendarmes, Ahmet joined the PKK after he was released.  The Çukurca prosecutor’s office concluded that the Van prosecutor’s office had jurisdiction and transferred the case file accordingly. 

A Van prosecutor issued a search and arrest warrant for Ahmet Er on January 5, 2006, for membership in an illegal organization (the PKK).  The Çukurca gendarmerie later reported to the prosecutor that their efforts to locate Ahmet Er had been unsuccessful. 

Article 2

Article 2 of the Convention states:

“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”

The Government argued that the applicants had failed to comply with the six-month time limit set forth in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.  In the Government’s view, the applicants should have applied to the Court within six months of the Hakkari Civil Court’s decision, which resulted in a decree stating that Ahmet Er was presumed dead.  The Court rejected this argument, noting that the civil proceedings were initiated to deal with property matters and the custody of Ahmet’s three youngest children.  Furthermore, the Court noted that the obligation to account for a disappearance and prosecute perpetrators does not end with discovery of a body or presumption of death. 

Next, the Court examined whether the applicants could be criticized for waiting almost nine years after Ahmet Er’s disappearance before applying to the ECHR.  The Court noted that, according to case law on the six-month rule in cases concerning deprivation of life, if no remedies are available or if they are judged ineffective, the six-month time limit runs from the date of the act complained of.  The Court noted that “special considerations” may apply where an applicant first makes use of a domestic remedy and only later becomes aware of circumstances that make the remedy ineffective.  In such situations, the six-month period can be calculated from the time when the applicant became or should have become aware of these circumstances.

The Court noted that in most disappearances, the investigating authorities have little evidence to begin with and must search for it.  Additionally, unlike in a killing, where the authorities’ purpose is merely to establish the circumstances of the killing and find and punish the perpetrator, an investigation into a disappearance also aims to find the missing person or discover what happened to him or her.  The Court cited Varnava and Others, observing that allowances must be made for the uncertainty and confusion that often follow a disappearance. 

The Court referred to two other considerations that justify a less rigorous approach when evaluating compliance with the six-month time limit in disappearance cases, again citing Varnava and Others.  First, there exists a consensus in international law that it should be possible to prosecute perpetrators of such acts many years after the events.  Second, it is best for the facts of cases to be investigated and issues to be resolved to the extent possible at the domestic level.

The Court cited the following holding from the Varnava case:

“In a complex disappearance situation such as the present, arising in a situation of international conflict, where it is alleged that there is a complete absence of any investigation or meaningful contact with the authorities, it may be expected that the relatives bring the case within, at most, several years of the incident. If there is an investigation of sorts, even if sporadic and plagued by problems, the relatives may reasonably wait some years longer until hope of progress being made has effectively evaporated. Where more than ten years has elapsed, the applicants would generally have to show convincingly that there was some ongoing, and concrete, advance being achieved to justify further delay in coming to Strasbourg. Stricter expectations would apply in cases where the applicants have direct domestic access to the investigative authorities.”

The Court noted that this case was brought within ten years of Ahmet’s disappearance, then proceeded to examine whether the applicants met the stricter expectations that apply due to their direct access to the investigative authorities. 

The Court noted that the applicants had immediately informed the prosecutor of Ahmet’s detention by the military and that the family cooperated with the prosecutor and provided eyewitness evidence.  Furthermore, the Court noted that the investigation initiated by the prosecutor continued actively until February 1996, and further steps were taken after the prosecutor decided that the military prosecutor had jurisdiction.  The military prosecutor requested further information from the military units and eyewitnesses.  The family cooperated with the military prosecutor, and the family’s attorney sought information about the investigation from the prosecutors.  The Court concluded that an investigation, although sporadic, was being conducted during the relevant time period, and the family did all that could be expected of them to assist the authorities.  Additionally, the 2003 decision of the civilian prosecutor who deemed evidence of military involvement in Ahmet’s disappearance credible, as well as the investigation by the military prosecutor, must have been considered promising developments by the family.  Thus, the Court found that the applicants did not fail to show the requisite diligence by awaiting the results of the investigations, and it rejected the Government’s objection to admissibility based on the six-month time limit. 

The Court rejected the Government’s argument that it had not been necessary to take procedural steps related to detention with respect to Ahmet Er because he had not been detained, mentioning previous judgments in which the failure of military personnel to keep adequate custody records led to the conclusion that effective safeguards against the disappearance of detainees were lacking.  On this basis, the Court concluded that it could not attach weight to the “unsatisfactory and arbitrary distinction” between being taken into custody and being taken to assist the military.

The Court stated: “The obligation to account for the well-being of a detainee exists even when it has not been proved that the person has been taken into custody by the authorities, if it is established that he or she was officially summoned by the military or the police, entered a place under their control and has not been seen since. In such circumstances, the onus is on the Government to provide a plausible explanation as to what happened on the premises and to show that the person concerned was not detained by the authorities, but left the premises without subsequently being deprived of his or her liberty.”  The Court cited Tanış and Others, stating that “the authorities’ obligation to account for the fate of a detained individual continues until they have shown that the person has been released.”  As noted above, no documents were drawn up regarding Ahmet Er’s detention or release, and the military officials gave contradictory and confusing evidence regarding Ahmet Er’s release from the gendarmerie station.  In light of these considerations, the Court found that Ahmet Er remained in the custody of the State, and the Government was thus obligated to account for his disappearance.  On the basis of that finding, the Court examined the alleged violations of Article 2. 

Ahmet Er’s Disappearance

The Court noted that Ahmet Er’s disappearance in 1995 fit in with the pattern of disappearances of large numbers of persons in southeast Turkey between 1992 and 1996.  In examining a number of those disappearances, the Court had concluded that the disappearance of a person in southeast Turkey at the relevant time could be life-threatening.  Additionally, the lack of documentation relating to Ahmet Er’s detention at the gendarmerie station increased the risk to his life in the context of the situation in southeast Turkey at the time.  For these reasons, and considering that no information has surfaced regarding the whereabouts of Ahmet Er for nearly seventeen years since his detention, the Court accepted that he must be presumed dead.  Thus, the responsibility of the respondent State for his death was engaged.  Since the State has not accounted for what happened during his detention and does not rely on justification respecting possible use of lethal force by its agents, liability for his death is attributable to the respondent Government.  Thus, the Court found a violation of Article 2 in its substantive aspect. 

Effectiveness of Investigation

The State’s obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2, together with its duty under Article 1 to secure everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, requires by implication an effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force.  This obligation is not limited to cases where it is apparent that the killing was caused by an agent of the State.  The Court noted that, although the prosecutor was informed of the detention of Ahmet Er on the day he was initially detained, no steps were taken by the prosecutor until two days later when he contacted a commando major by telephone.  The prosecutor did not further question any members of the security forces for five months.  Although the prosecutor made inquiries and followed up with those who failed to respond, his investigation seemingly lost momentum.  The prosecutor apparently accepted without further investigation what the military officials told him about Ahmet Er’s alleged release and did not take steps to call military officials to account for Ahmet Er’s unlawful detention.  The Court concluded that the prosecutors made no serious attempts to find out what happened to Ahmet Er.  The Court found that the investigation into Ahmet’s disappearance was inadequate and in breach of the State’s procedural obligations to protect the right to life; thus, Article 2 had been violated in its procedural aspect.

Article 3

Article 3 states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

The Court found that the applicants suffered and continue to suffer distress and anguish due to the disappearance of their relative and their inability to find out what happened to him, and the authorities’ manner of dealing with their complaints constituted inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.  Thus, Article 3 was violated with respect to the applicants. 

Article 5

Article 5 of the Convention states:

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;

(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;

(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;

(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;

(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.

....”

The Court stated that the fact that Ahmet Er’s detention and release were not logged in the records of the gendarmerie station is a serious failing in that it allows those responsible for an act of deprivation of liberty to escape accountability for the fate of a detainee.  The absence of recorded data such as date, time, and location of detention, name of detainee, reason for detention and name of person effecting it, and time and date of release is incompatible with the purpose of Article 5.  The Court found that Ahmet was held in unacknowledged detention in the complete absence of the safeguards of Article 5 and that there was a violation of the right to liberty and security guaranteed by that provision.

Article 13

Article 13 states:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

Where relatives have an arguable claim that a family member disappeared at the hands of authorities or in a situation where the right to life is at stake, Article 13 requires a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the punishment of those responsible; it also requires the payment of compensation where appropriate.  The Court found that the authorities failed to comply with their obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the disappearance of Ahmet Er.  Consequently, Article 13 was violated.

ECHR Holds that Arrest for Displaying Controversial Flag Breached Right to Freedom of Expression

In the case of Fáber v. Hungary, the ECHR held that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated where Government authorities arrested and fined a man for displaying a controversial flag. 

On the day Mr. Fáber, a Hungarian national, was arrested, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) was holding a demonstration against racism and hatred in Budapest.  At the same time, members of Jobbik, a right-wing political party, held a counter-protest nearby.  Police observed Mr. Fáber standing near the demonstrators and holding an Árpád-striped flag at a location where, during the Arrow Cross regime(1944/1945), many Jews were exterminated. The police, who had testified that they were instructed not to allow the Árpád-striped flag within 100 meters of the MSZP demonstration, requested that Mr. Fáber cease displaying the flag or leave the area.  Mr. Fáber refused, saying that the flag was a historical symbol and no law prohibited its display.  He was held in police custody and subjected to interrogation for six hours.  He was also fined for disobeying police instructions.  On appeal, the Hungarian court upheld Mr. Fáber’s conviction, reasoning that his behavior was of a provocative nature. 

Article 10 reads as follows:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, ....

Mr. Fáber complained that his prosecution constituted an unjustified interference with his freedom of expression. 

The Court considered that this type of case required it to balance the right to freedom of assembly against the right to freedom of expression and, allegedly, against the right of others to freedom of assembly.

As the issue was not disputed, the Court concluded that there was an interference with Mr. Fáber’s right to freedom of expression.  The Court also concluded that the interference was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of “prevention of disorder” and “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

To ascertain whether restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression are necessary in a democratic society, the court determines whether the interference complained of corresponds to a pressing social need. 

The Court stated: “Given the applicant’s passive conduct, the distance from the MSZP demonstration and the absence of any demonstrated risk of insecurity or disturbance, it cannot be held that the reasons given by the national authorities to justify the interference complained of are relevant and sufficient.” 

Although some demonstrators may have been troubled by the display of the Árpád-striped flag, they made no verbal threat.  With respect to the rights of other demonstrators and public tranquility, the Court found that there was no pressing social need for police to intervene.  The Court found that, although some demonstrators may have considered the flag offensive, shocking, or “fascist,” its mere display could not disturb public order or impede the exercise of the demonstrators’ right to assemble, since it was “neither intimidating, nor capable of inciting to violence by instilling a deep-seated and irrational hatred against identifiable persons….”  The Court emphasized that bad feelings or outrage, in the absence of intimidation, could not constitute a pressing social need for the purposes of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 

The Court found that the restriction on Mr. Fáber’s right to freedom of expression did not meet a pressing social need and could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.  Thus, there was a violation of Article 10 read in light of Article 11 of the Convention. 

Malian Government Refers Situation in Mali to ICC

The Government of Mali, through its Minister of Justice H.E. Malick Coulibaly, has referred the situation in Mali since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court (ICC) so that it might be ascertained whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of crimes.  The Malian Government says its courts cannot prosecute or try the perpetrators.

Earlier in the year, a coup toppled Mali’s democratic government.  More recently, the northern part of the country has fallen into the hands of Islamist rebels. 

The Government of Mali alleges that serious human rights violations and breaches of international law have occurred, including summary executions of Malian soldiers, rape, massacre of the civilian population, enlistment of child soldiers, torture, enforced disappearances, and the destruction of buildings and landmarks.  Such acts are within the ambit of articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute. 

According to a statement by ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, the Malian cabinet decided on May 30, 2012, to refer the situation to the ICC.  Ms. Bensouda stated that her office had been following the Mali situation since violence erupted around January 2012.  On July 1, Ms. Bensouda had warned that deliberate destruction of shrines in Timbuktu may constitute war crimes under article 8 of the Rome Statute. 

The Prosecutor stated that she intends to engage in a preliminary examination of the situation to determine whether an investigation should be opened.

ICC Issues Two Arrest Warrants

On July 13, 2012, Pre-trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued two arrest warrants with respect to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one for Sylvestre Mudacumura and one for Bosco Ntganda.

Bosco Ntganda

Mr. Ntganda is suspected of committing war crimes and/or crimes against humanity during the conflict in the district of Ituri, Province Orientale. 

Mr. Ntganda was the deputy chief of staff for the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC)/Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) and commander of operations of the FPLC.  Ntganda commanded all FPLC sectors and brigades and all of the organization’s military operations. 

The prosecutor contended that Ntganda planned and commanded military attacks against the Lendu and other non-Hema tribes.  UPC and FPLC troops allegedly overran and ransacked villages and towns, killing and raping civilians across Ituri. 

Before a Chamber issues an arrest warrant, article 58(1) of the Rome Statute (hereinafter called “Statute”) requires that the Chamber be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused person committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  The evidence need only establish a reasonable conclusion that the person committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, and it is not required that this be the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence.

Based on evidence presented by the Prosecutor, the Chamber determined that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Ntganda is responsible for three counts of crimes against humanity: persecution based on ethnic grounds; rape and sexual slavery; and murder.  The Chamber also concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Ntganda is criminally responsible for the following war crimes: attack against the civilian population, murder, rape and sexual slavery, and pillaging. 

The Chamber found that Ntganda’s arrest was necessary to ensure his appearance at trial, to ensure that he does not obstruct or endanger the investigation, and to prevent the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. 

This is the second arrest warrant issued by the ICC with respect to Mr. Ntganda.  The first arrest warrant for Ntganda was issued on August 22, 2006, for three counts of war crimes allegedly committed in Ituri: enlistment of children under age fifteen, conscription of children under age fifteen, and using children under age fifteen to participate in hostilities.

Sylvestre Mudacumura

Sylvestre Mudacumura is suspected of committing war crimes during the conflict in the Kivu provinces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between January 20, 2009, and September 30, 2010.  Mudacumura was the top military commander of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) during the relevant time period and still appears to hold that position.  Based on evidence presented by the Prosecutor, pretrial Chamber II found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Mudacumura is responsible for nine counts of war crimes, including murder, mutilation, attacks against civilians, cruel treatment, rape, torture, pillaging, destruction of property, and outrages against personal dignity. 

Mudacumura allegedly bears individual criminal responsibility under article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute for ordering the commission of these war crimes.

Acts specified in article 7(1) of the Statute qualify as crimes against humanity only if they are committed as part of a widespread or systemic attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack.  According to article 7(2) of the Statute, “attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of conduct involving the multiple commissions of acts referred to in article 7(1) against any civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy to commit such an attack.  Thus, it must be demonstrated that a state or organizational policy existed under which a civilian population was the primary object of the attack, and, according to the Elements of Crimes, a “policy to commit such attack” requires that the state or organization “actively promote or encourage such an attack against the civilian population.”

The Chamber decided that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity were committed because, although the FDLR was responsible for commission of multiple acts referred to in article 7(1), the Chamber could not reasonably conclude that the civilian population was the primary object of those acts. 

The Chamber found that the arrest of Mudacumura was necessary to ensure that:

1)      he will appear before the judges;

2)      he will not obstruct the Court proceedings; and

3)      he will not continue with the commission of a crime within ICC jurisdiction.

International Criminal Court Sentences Thomas Lubanga Dyilo

Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court sentenced Thomas Lubanga Dyilo to fourteen years in prison, less the time from his surrender to the ICC (on March 16, 2006) until today.  He was convicted of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen and using them to participate in hostilities in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

The prosecution argued that the Chamber was required to take into consideration facts and circumstances beyond those in the charges, while the defense argued that the matters the Chamber could take into account were limited by the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges.  The Chamber concluded that evidence admitted for consideration at the sentencing stage could exceed the facts and circumstances set out in the confirmation decision, provided the defense had a reasonable opportunity to address that evidence.   

The prosecution asserted that aggravating factors should be based on a “balance of probabilities” test, while the defense argued that aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Chamber had to establish the standard of proof for the purpose of sentencing, since the Statute and Rules do not provide guidance.  The Chamber concluded that, since aggravating factors could have a significant effect on the length of Mr. Lubanga’s sentence, those factors must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The Chamber concluded that the standard of proof for mitigating factors should be the “balance of probabilities” standard. 

In assessing the gravity of the crime, the Chamber noted that conscripting and enlisting children under age fifteen and using them to participate in hostilities are very serious crimes that affect the international community as a whole.

The Chamber stated that, in accordance with Rule 143, it considered the gravity of the crimes in the circumstances of this case, with regard to the extent of the damage caused, in particular “the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful behavior and the means employed to execute the crime; the degree of participation of the convicted person; the degree of intent; the circumstances of manner, time and location; and the age, education, social and economic condition of the convicted person”.

With respect to the “circumstances of manner, time, and location” of the crimes, the Chamber had concluded in its Judgment that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt the recruitment of young people, including children under fifteen, was widespread, that a significant number of children were used as military guards and as escorts for senior commanders, and that children under fifteen were used in hostilities.

With respect to the degree of participation and intent of the convicted person, the Chamber did not conclude that Mr. Lubanga intended to conscript and enlist children under fifteen and use them in hostilities; rather, the Chamber concluded that he was aware that this would occur. 

In considering the individual circumstances of the convicted person, the Chamber noted that Mr. Lubanga is intelligent and well-educated and would have understood the seriousness of the crimes of which he was convicted.  The Chamber viewed the “marked level of awareness on his part” as a relevant factor for sentencing.

The Chamber found no aggravating factors in the case. 

The Chamber accepted as a mitigating factor Mr. Lubanga’s respectful attitude and cooperation with the Court throughout the proceedings, despite some onerous circumstances. 

ICC Trials Scheduled in Two Kenyan Cases

Trial Chamber V of the International Criminal Court issued scheduling orders setting the trial start dates for two cases.   The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang is scheduled to begin on April 10, 2013, and The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta is set to commence on April 11, 2013.

William Samoei Ruto is a former Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology of the Republic of Kenya.  He is accused of being criminally responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator (pursuant to article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute) for the following crimes against humanity:  murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, and persecution.

Joshua Arap Sang is Head of Operations at KASS FM in Nairobi, the Republic of Kenya.  The pre-trial chamber found no substantial grounds to believe he was an indirect co-perpetrator because his contribution to the crimes was not essential to their commission.  He is accused of having otherwise contributed (within the meaning of article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute) to the following crimes against humanity: murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, and persecution.

Francis Kirimi Muthaura is a former head of the Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet of the Republic of Kenya.  Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta is the Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister for Finance of the Republic of Kenya.  The two are accused of being indirect co-perpetrators of the following crimes against humanity: murder, deportation or forcible transfer, rape, persecution, and other inhumane acts.

Ratko Mladic Trial Resumes

First Witness Takes Stand

The trial of Ratko Mladic before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia resumed on Monday, and the Prosecution's first witness testified. 

General Mladic led the Bosnian Serb Army from May 12, 1992, until at least November 8, 1996, and is charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

More on this story from BBC News*


*The owner of this blog takes no responsibility for the content of external sites.

ECHR Rules Lutsenko Arrest and Detention Unlawful

In a Chamber judgment in the case of Lutsenko v. Ukraine (no. 6942/11), the ECHR held that Articles 5 §§ 1-4 and Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated.  The Court held that Lutsenko’s arrest was arbitrary; no valid reasons were given for his detention; he was not informed of the reasons for his detention; and the lawfulness of his arrest and detention were not properly reviewed.

The applicant, Yuriy Vitaliyovych Lutsenko, is a prominent opposition politician in the Ukraine.  He is the leader of Narodna Samooborona, an opposition political party, and was Minister of the Interior in the government headed by Yulia Tymoshenko until January 2010.  Mr. Lutsenko is currently detained in Kyiv. 

In November 2010, the Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s Office initiated criminal proceedings against Mr. Lutsenko, alleging that Mr. Lutsenko had illegally arranged work-related benefits for his driver.  In December 2010, the General Prosecutor’s Office instigated another criminal case against Lutsenko for abuse of office, alleging that he had arranged for an apartment for his driver.  The cases were joined (“first case”), and Lutsenko was formally indicted.  The prosecutor allowed Lutsenko to study the case file, which he did on several occasions.  Then, on December 24, 2010, the General Prosecutor’s office instituted yet another set of criminal proceedings against Mr. Lutsenko for abuse of office, this time alleging that Lutsenko had unlawfully authorized search and seizure activities against an individual.

On December 26, 2010, Lutsenko was arrested by Security Service officers and the investigator of the General Prosecutor’s Office in connection with the criminal case initiated on December 24.  Mr. Lutsenko asserts that he was not given a copy of the charge sheet and was not informed of the reason for the arrest.

On the following day, Lutsenko and his attorney attended a court hearing, which they did not know about until twenty minutes prior to its commencement.  The subject of the hearing was the prosecutor’s request to keep Lutsenko in detention pending his trial in the first case.  Mr. Lutsenko alleged that he only discovered after the hearing began that it did not concern his arrest on the previous day.  The court granted the prosecutor’s request.  The court reasoned that Lutsenko and his attorney had studied the case file slowly and had given information about it to the media.  Additionally, the court found that Lutsenko had tried to prevent the investigation, was capable of influencing the investigation, and had not admitted guilt.  

Lutsenko’s lawyer lodged an unsuccessful appeal.  Lutsenko was convicted and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment and confiscation of property.  The judgment was upheld on appeal.  An appeal in cassation is pending.

Complaints and Procedure

Mr. Lutsenko complained that his arrest and detention were arbitrary and unlawful and that he had not been informed of the reasons for his arrest, in violation of Article 5 §§ 1(b)-(c), 2, and 3.  He also complained, under Article 6 §§ 1, 2, and 3(a)-(b) (right to a fair trial), that he was not informed in advance of the subject of the December 27 hearing, nor was he given time and facilities to prepare.  (The ECHR decided to consider the case under Article 5.) 

The application was lodged with the ECHR on January 21, 2011.  A Chamber hearing was held on April 17, 2012. 

Article 5 § 1 (right to liberty and security)

Arrest

The Court noted that Mr. Lutsenko was arrested within the framework of the second criminal case and taken to court on the next day.  However, the domestic court did not examine, and indeed had not intended to examine, the lawfulness of Mr. Lutsenko’s arrest.  The Court further noted that the prosecuting authorities took Mr. Lutsenko to court for the sole purpose of presenting their application to detain the applicant in connection with the first criminal case, and in fact opposed examination of the lawfulness of Lutsenko’s arrest.  In the Court’s view, this suggested that the purpose of Mr. Lutsenko’s arrest had not been to bring him before a competent legal authority within the same criminal case, but to ensure his availability for examination of the prosecuting authority’s application to detain the Mr. Lutsenko in connection with another set of criminal proceedings.

Furthermore, the Court observed that the arrest of Mr. Lutsenko had not been “necessary to prevent him from committing an offence or fleeing after having done so” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1.  Although one of the reasons given in the order for Mr. Lutsenko’s arrest was to prevent his continuing criminal activities, the authorities failed to explain in what way the applicant, being accused of abuse of office, could continue that type of activity almost a year after he had left the office of Minister of the Interior.  As to the risk of fleeing, Mr. Lutsenko was under an obligation not to abscond, which he had given to the same investigator who had arrested him and who did not appear to have any complaints regarding the applicant’s compliance with that obligation.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concluded that Mr. Lutsenko’s arrest had been for a purpose other than that indicated in Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and was therefore arbitrary and contrary to this provision.  Thus, there was a violation of Article 5 § 1 in this respect.

Article 5 § 1

Detention

The Court found that the domestic court’s decision ordering Mr. Lutsenko’s detention was based on questionable grounds.  With respect to the assertion that Mr. Lutsenko studied the case file slowly, the Court was not persuaded that deprivation of liberty was an adequate response in such a case, and the measure was applied after only ten days of studying the case file.  Furthermore, the applicant provided submissions to show that this ground for detention contradicted Ukrainian law, which provided that examination of the case file was a right, not an obligation, of the accused and that the time available to the accused to study the case file should not be limited.  However, the domestic courts did not examine these submissions and did not assess to what extent the manner in which the investigator provided the case file to Mr. Lutsenko complied with Ukrainian law.

With respect to the assertion that Mr. Lutsenko’s interviews with the media put pressure on a witness, neither the domestic authorities nor the Government explained how or in what way witnesses had been threatened by Mr. Lutsenko’s public statements.  Furthermore, they did not explain why detention could be considered an adequate response to such statements.  Since Lutsenko was a prominent political figure, he could be expected to express his opinion on the proceedings, and this would probably interest both his supporters and his opponents.  In the Court’s view, the fact that Mr. Lutsenko exercised his freedom of speech, which did not constitute any offence, did not justify depriving him of his liberty.

Advancing Mr. Lutsenko’s failure to testify and to admit his guilt as grounds for detention runs contrary to elements of a fair trial.  Specifically, it is contrary to the principals of freedom from self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence.  The Court viewed advancing such grounds to justify custodial measures as disturbing because the implication is that a person could be punished for relying on his basic rights to a fair trial. 

Finally, ordering detention without fixing a time limit contravened Article 5 § 1. 

Thus, Mr. Lutsenko’s detention was in violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

Article 5 § 2 (right to be informed of the reasons for one’s arrest)

Whether and to what extent Lutsenko was informed of the formal reasons for his arrest was in dispute.  However, the Government did not deny that, at the time of his arrest on December 26, 2010, Lutsenko had not been informed of the prosecutor’s application for his detention.  In fact, he was only informed of the application on December 27, more than 24 hours after his arrest.  Thus, the authorities failed to comply with their obligations under Article 5 § 2.  Accordingly, that provision was violated. 

Article 5 § 3 (right to be brought promptly before a judge)

When Mr. Lutsenko was brought before the court following his arrest, the court, despite Lutsenko’s complaint of unlawful arrest, did not examine the lawfulness of his detention.  It did not appear that the authorities had any intention of ensuring that the applicant was afforded the automatic judicial control of his detention required by Article 5 § 3.  Thus, Article 5 § 3 was violated.

As the Court previously observed, the applicant was not informed of the hearing’s subject in advance, and the domestic court did not examine the necessity of the deprivation of Lutsenko’s liberty in a satisfactory manner.  The Court further observed that the domestic court did not consider the possibility of using measures other than deprivation of liberty.  Mr. Lutsenko’s request to be given appropriate time to examine the materials brought forward by the prosecution and to prepare his defense was refused without justification.  It was for Mr. Lutsenko and his lawyer, the Court said, and not the authorities, to decide whether he needed to study the materials used to support his arrest.  “Such behaviour by the domestic authorities,” the Court said, “seriously affected the equality of arms between the parties.”

Thus, the proceedings concerning the change in preventive measures (i.e., a change to pre-trial detention) applied to Mr. Lutsenko did not comply with the requirements of Article 5 § 3.  Accordingly, there was also a violation of Article 5 § 3 in this respect.

Article 5 § 4 (right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention)

The Kyiv Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Lutsenko’s appeal without giving a proper reply to his arguments, which, in the Court’s opinion, appeared to be pertinent and worthy of examination.  Additionally, it did not give an adequate response to a request signed by members of parliament and supported by the Ombudsman for Mr. Lutsenko’s release on bail. 

The Court concluded that Mr. Lutsenko had not been given a proper judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention.  Accordingly, Article 5 § 4 of the Convention was violated.

Article 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights)

In his submissions to the ECHR, Mr. Lutsenko complained, without referring to any Convention provision, that the proceedings against him and his arrest were used by the authorities to exclude him from political life and from participation in the upcoming parliamentary elections.  The Court decided that this should be considered under Article 18. 

As the Court had already established, the grounds advanced by the authorities for the deprivation of Mr. Lutsenko’s liberty were incompatible with Article 5 § 1 and were against the spirit of the Convention.  The Court observed that the profile of the applicant, one of the opposition leaders who had spoken with the media, had attracted considerable public attention.  The Court considered that, being accused of abuse of office, Lutsenko had the right to reply to the accusation through the media.  The prosecuting authorities indicated Lutsenko’s communication with the media as one of the grounds for his arrest and accused him of distorting public opinion about crimes he committed, discrediting the prosecuting authorities, and influencing the upcoming trial to avoid liability. 

The Court stated in its opinion: “In the Court’s opinion, such reasoning by the prosecuting authorities clearly demonstrates their attempt to punish the applicant for publicly disagreeing with accusations against him and for asserting his innocence, which he had the right to do. In such circumstances, the Court cannot but find that the restriction of the applicant’s liberty permitted under Article 5 § 1 (c) was applied not only for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence, but also for other reasons.”

Thus, there was a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5.